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them from deceit and to promote their well-being, that tutor should not be and cannot be other than the Government of the United States, which is directly interested in seeing that the map of America should register no other nationalities. It is our opinion that the Panama Canal will be opened owing to the necessity felt by the commercial world for that cheap and commodious route, but in truth we must say that no other country save that of North America can carry to a happy conclusion that great work, since only that country possesses the requisites which are necessary to finish it, and which are: An abundance of money, fitting machinery which cannot be found in other countries, and habits of work united to reasonable economy in expenditures."

The *Star & Herald* in an editorial in its issue of May 17th, 1889, under the caption of "Future of Panama," takes a philosophic view of the situation and urges the Isthmian people to bestir themselves and develop the rich possibilities that lie between the two oceans.



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
*New Stands at Panama, Pedro Miguel, Culebra, Empire, Gatun and Cristobal.*

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## The Second, Or New Company.

The history of the new company does not record any startling achievement in the amount of work accomplished, in fact, the rather desultory manner in which the work was carried on lends color to the belief that it was organized primarily at least, to protect the assets of the old company, and to make a sale when the opportune moment arrived. Compared with the amount of money expended however, it made a much better showing than the old company. With a working capital of less than \$13,000,000 it excavated some 10,000,000 cubic meters of material, as compared with about 50,000,000 cubic meters excavated by the old company at a cost of upwards of \$250,000,000. In this connection consideration must be given the fact that with the new company plant and material was ready at hand, so that the expense on this account was comparatively small. It was also the expectation that at the end of three or four years' work the investing public would have their confidence in the undertaking restored, and provide more funds for the purpose, but this expectation did not materialize.

In 1890, the services of Lieut. Wyse were again brought into play and on December 10th of that year he secured a new agreement with Colombia granting a ten year extension for the completion of the work. The delay



*Gorgona, a general view of the American Settlement--Panama.  
Publication authorized by the U.S. Army, Office of Advertising, Bureau of Equipment, II*

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in organizing the new company made it impracticable to comply with the above time limit, and negotiations with Colombia were reopened. On April 4, 1893, another extension was granted which provided for the resumption of work on a permanent basis by October 31, 1894, and the completion of the canal within ten years from that date. Toward the close of the nineties it was manifest that the concession would expire before the work could be finished, so in April, 1900 a third extension was arranged which stipulated that the canal should be completed by October 31, 1910. In passing it is just to observe that the Colombian Government exercised a remarkable degree of patience in this connection.

## A Stupendous Undertaking.

The organization of the new company was a stupendous undertaking in the face of the fact that the mere mention of "Panama" to a French investor was like flaunting a red rag in front of a bull. Visions of graft and extrav-

agance floated ever before his mind. However, in October, 1894, the "New Panama Canal Company" was finally launched upon the troublesome waters of canal endeavor, with a capital stock of 65,000,000 francs (\$13,000,000), divided into shares of 100 francs each. Under the agreement 50,000 shares fully paid up were at once set aside for the Colombian Government. The receiver of the old company became a party to the new organization and transferred all the property and assets of the old company, real and personal, whether in France or Panama, including the grants from the Colombian Government; also the rights of every nature in the Panama Railroad, which had been obtained through arrangements entered into between the company and the holders of railroad stock. The receiver also subscribed in his official capacity for about one-fourth of the stock of the new company.

Under the terms of the transfer the new company had a title to the whole property, but the rights of those interested in the old company were not entirely extinguished. The latter were under no further obligations to contribute toward the auxiliary works, but its successful completion and operation would be of advantage to them to some extent, inasmuch as under the terms of the sale sixty per cent. of the surplus income after payment of expenses, charges and stipulated dividends was to be appropriated by the receiver for distribution among them. While there might be little or nothing left for the proposed distribution, the existence of this right in favor of the shareholders in the old company made concurrence obligatory in case of a sale of the property.

Should the construction have gone by default on October 31, 1910, the concession would have lapsed, but through its railroad contract the company would have exclusive control of the territory through which the line extended until 1966, but being absolutely prohibited the while from selling to any foreign government, it was manifest that even if the privileges of the company could have been purchased,

the conditions would not have permitted of any other government exercising its rights of ownership in connection with the construction of the canal.

The receiver according to the terms of transfer was clothed with authority to appoint a commission of engineers to rectify previous surveys, inspect progress made and to supervise expenditures, and one of the first steps taken was to organize the *Comite Technique*, consisting of seven French engineers. This committee made in all three different reports. The first proposed a lock canal at an impracticable height; the second provided for a lock canal, the bottom of which should be 20.75 meters, or about 68 feet above sea level. The locks according to this plan would be five in number, one each at Bohio and Bas Obispo on the Atlantic side of the divide, and one each at Paraiso and Miraflores, with a tidal lock near Miraflores on the Pacific side. The third plan comprehended a canal the bottom of which would be about 32 feet above sea level, and with but three locks, one at Bohio, another at or near Pedro Miguel, and the third at Miraflores.

### **Net Results.**

The committee's plan for regulating the Chagres River, and to obtain therefrom the requisite amount of water to operate the canal at all times, consisted in the construction of a dam at Bohio of 250,000,000 cubic meter capacity, and of another dam farther up the river at Alhajucla, capable of storing 150,000,000 cubic meters of water. With the lake at Bohio, and the reservoir at Alhajucla, it was estimated that there would be no difficulty as to a sufficient water supply at any period of the year. The old company engineers proposed the site of Gamboa for a dam after it took up the lock canal proposition, but the *Comite Technique* considered this site as entirely unsuitable. The Gatun site of the present day never entered into the calculations of the French engineers.

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The Comite Technique left as a heritage a vast amount of valuable papers bearing upon surveys and chartings which have been used to good purpose by the Isthmian Canal Commission. Apart from these, the results of the efforts of the new company were small. The actual construction work was confined principally to excavating in Culebra cut, and work at the Pacific entrance to the canal. Not to exceed 3,000 men were on the company's pay rolls at any one time, as compared with the maximum number of 25,000 in the best days of the old company.

The amount of excavation done by the two French companies during the active period of their existence is shown by the following data:

Highest elevation at Culebra before work began .....	312 ft.
Highest elevation at Bas Obispo before work began.....	233 ft.
Greatest depth of excavation by the French at Culebra ....	161 ft.
Greatest depth of excavation by the French at Bas Obispo....	148 ft.
Total excavation by the French including diversion channel	70,000,000 Cu. Yds.

## MUTTERINGS OF SEPARATION.

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Talk of separation bobbed to the surface repeatedly during the interval of eighty or more years between Panama's independence from Spain, and the secession movement of 1903. The tie that bound her to the Granadine Confederation, and later to Colombia had always been a galling one. It was continually a game of give and take, with Panama in the charity role.

The people of the Isthmus were not long in sizing up the situation, and as early as 1827 started a separation movement, which had for its aim annexation with Great Britain. The prime movers of this, set forth the fact that the commercial relations of Panama with the interior departments of Colombia amounted to but little; natural barriers preventing free intercourse, and complained that the inhabitants of the southern part of the republic treated the people of the Isthmus as foreigners and preyed on their commerce. Before the movement had gained much headway however, the patriot, Bolivar stepped into the breach and pacified the secessionists.

The next attempt at separation occurred on November 18, 1840 when the people of the city of Panama, under the leadership of Col. Tomas Herrera arose en masse and proclaimed their independence. Inasmuch as the civil head of the Isthmus, Dr. Carlos de Icaza, was himself in sympathy with the movement, no opposition was offered by the authorities.

Dr. Rufino Cuervo, at that time Minister of Colombia at Quito, hearing of what was going on in Panama sent Col. Anselmo Pineda and Dr. Ricardo de la Parra there with the object of discouraging the movement, and to reincorporate the Isthmus into the Granadine Confederation. The commissioners promised a much better adminis-

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
**P. Oduber & Co.**

tration of affairs in which Panama was concerned, and full amnesty for those connected with the separation plot. In view of the fact that these promises were backed by guarantees from Dr. Cuervo, Gen. Juan José Flores, and the President of Ecuador, the people of the Isthmus entered into a new treaty on December 31, 1841, by which Panama once more became a member of the New Granadian League.

In March 1842, Domingo Caicedo, then Vice-President of New Granada, repudiated this treaty, claiming that Dr. Cuervo and Dr. Parra had exceeded their powers, and in the same year the Granadian Congress repudiated the law granting amnesty to the Panameños. Many of the latter to avoid persecution were forced to expatriate themselves.

Another agitation for independence was started in 1860, fostered by José de Obaldia, then Governor. At this period New Granada was badly disorganized, having just been racked by civil war, which resulted in the pro-





*The J. C. C. Hospital in Colon -- Panama.*  
*Sullivan - American & P. O. S. News Agency & Advertising Bureau, A. Steinhardt.*

claiming of Tomas Cipriano Mosquera, dictator. Obaldia thought the time propitious and announced his intentions to the Bogota Government, advising that it was proposed to set up an establishment under the protectorate of either the United States, France or England. At this juncture, Obaldia was succeeded by Santiago de la Guardia, as Governor, and the latter neglected to follow up the advantage. Mosquera by this time had gotten his political affairs straightened out somewhat, and turned his attention to the Isthmus. In 1861, he sent a deputy to Colon to meet the Isthmians and arrange a new treaty which provided for more promises and guarantees, but in less than a year Mosquera saw fit to repudiate the agreement.

On Feb. 27, 1855, the Government of New Granada conferred on the Isthmus, the title of "State of Panama," and the rights and privileges of a sovereign state, a distinction not shared in by the other provinces of the Republic. It is doubtful however, if this act ever resulted in any benefit, direct or indirect, to the people of Panama.

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## IN THE THROES OF REVOLUTION.

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The political history of the Isthmus is marked by many a wound and many a scar, but its troubled waters has been stirred so often in times past that the breaking out of a revolution ceased to excite more than passing comment abroad. Many of these internecine struggles were insignificant in their nature and of short duration, but the war of 1900 to 1902 was of an entirely different character and constituted the most sanguinary epoch in the annals of the Isthmus.

The trouble first started in the interior of Colombia, and before hostilities were finally suspended, the flame of

revolt had spread the length and breadth of the country. For more than fifteen years the ruling party in Colombia had been the Conservative' or clerical party as it was sometimes called. In 1898 this party lost the reins of government through a deflection from its ranks of a group of men calling themselves Nationalists. The Nationalists favored a milder course toward the Liberals and elected Dr. Manuel Sanclemente, President. Meanwhile the Conservatives were not idle, and the following year succeeded in having Sanclemente deposed by "golpe de estado" (1). This brought the Conservative party back into power with José M. Marroquin, Vice-President under Sanclemente, at its head.

The Liberal party at this period is said to have constituted about seventy per cent. of the entire population, exclusive of the uncivilized Indians. Many years before when in power, this party had incurred the enmity of the church by expelling the Jesuits and confiscating church property for the use of state and education. Since then, to check the party's growth and to stamp out liberal tendencies, it is alleged that the offices of the church were frequently used. Many are said to have been excommunicated; the marriage service and rites of burial refused, and their children denied admission to the schools. Furthermore they were not entitled to the privileges of the courts, and often awoke in the morning to find their property confiscated and an order of arrest confronting them. They were permitted no representation in local or federal offices, nor in Congress, with the notable exception of Gen. Rafael Uribe-Urbe, a man of uncommon intelligence and a natural born leader whose personal following was too strong to be easily thrust aside.


### **Disaffection Reaches Panama.**

It only needed a decided incentive at this stage to plunge the country into a civil war, and the incentive was

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(1) A sudden act performed by the State for state reasons.





**BEFORE THE TRENCHES NEAR CALEDONIA BRIDGE.**

(COURTESY OF DONALDO VELASCO.)

city of Panama. He then demanded through the foreign consuls the capitulation of the town without fighting in order to avert loss of life. The consular representatives labored earnestly to come to some understanding, but the negotiations which occupied two days' time completely failed. In the meantime the government forces had been working day and night strengthening the defenses and preparing for the attack, while many of the townspeople took advantage of the temporary lull in hostilities by betaking themselves to a place of safety. Many took refuge on board the British cruiser "Leander" at anchor in the bay. His delay in pushing the attack subjected Gen. Herrera to severe criticism on the part of his subordinate officers who claimed that but for these dilatory tactics which enabled the government forces to form their plan of defense and dispose their men to the best advantage, the victory at Corozal could very easily have been duplicated at Panama. Looking at it from a purely humanitarian point of view however, Gen. Herrera's act appears commendable.

The attack on the city commenced from three sides and continued day and night for seventy-two hours, with only an occasional intermission to allow the removal of the wounded. This was effected in part by an ambulance corps of one hundred men from the "Leander" who voluntarily placed their services at the disposal of the authorities.

The fighting was very fierce and at times hand to hand in the trenches and behind the barricades. The operations were principally confined to that part of the town known as Pueblo Nuevo, San Miguel and Caledonia, now directly overlooked by the Hotel Tivoli. On the second night of the battle the government troops were reinforced by the arrival of several hundred men of the Colombian Line from Colon, under the command of Gen. Sarria. He also brought word that still more troops were being despatched from Colon by the Governor of Panama. Gen. Campo Serrano.

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The above news coupled with the determined resistance offered by the government forces, and a shortage of ammunition discouraged the revolutionists, and at the termination of the three days' fighting, a truce was arranged. This resulted in the revolutionists accepting the offer of Gen. Alban, the military and civil chief of Panama, to surrender with honor and be placed on parole.

The trenches and outskirts of the city presented a terrible sight after the battle. The streets and fields were strewn with the unburied dead, among them being some of the best of Panama's young men who had espoused the cause on both sides.

From this date until the cessation of hostilities, the city of Panama, being used as the head military post of the Colombian government on the Isthmus for troops and supplies, was kept in comparative peace and quiet, although the ensuing two years witnessed continual fighting in other parts of the country. At one time the revolutionists were in possession of every important point and post, with the exception of the city of Panama. The United States Government at the request of the authorities at Bogota finally lauded a force of marines to keep the transit open. Fighting was thereupon stopped along the line of the railroad, and to insure further the preservation of order, from three to four warships rode at anchor in the harbor.


## The Sinking of the "Lautaro".

The naval battle in the bay of Panama on January 20, 1902, which resulted in the sinking of the Colombian gunboat *Lautaro*, and the death of Gen. Carlos Alban, the government's chief military representative on the Isthmus, afforded one of the most interesting spectacles connected with the revolution. A few days previous to this engagement the *Lautaro*, a boat belonging to the Chilean steamship line, had been impressed into service by the government authorities without waiting for the consent of the head of affairs at Bogota. Guns were mounted and the boat otherwise put in readiness to go in search of the revolutionary vessel *Padilla*, and to relieve the garrison at Aguadulce which at that time was being hard pressed by the Liberals.

On the night before the *Lautaro* met her fate, Gen. Alban with several of his officers went on board and discovered the Chilean crew had broken into the spirit room and were committing drunken excesses, one being the letting of all the fresh water out of the tanks. Finding it useless to try and discipline them, the general retired and was awakened in the morning with the information that a vessel was steaming into the harbor showing no distinctive colors. After passing inside of where the American cruiser, *Philadelphía* lay at anchor, the boat which proved to be the *Padilla*, opened a well-directed fire on the *Lautaro* dismounting one of its guns at the first shot, and killing Gen. Alban and several other men at the second fire.

In the meantime the small Colombian gunboat *Chucuito* with Gen. Esteban Huertas and Gen. H. O. Jeffries on board came up from La Boca and steamed to within five hundred yards of the *Padilla*. The *Chucuito* immediately opened up with a light rapid-fire automatic gun which however, made no impression on the revolutionary steamer. The latter continued to hammer away at the *Lautaro* until the vessel caught fire and sank slowly out of sight





**SINKING OF THE "LAUTARO"**

(COURTESY OF DONALDO VELASCO.)

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beneath the waters of the bay. The noise of discharging cannon and the blowing up of the powder magazine on the doomed boat as the fire reached it, performed a fitting requiem over the dead body of the military chief, Gen. Alban, which went down at the same time.

The upper part of the masts of the *Lautaro* may be readily seen to-day at low tide sticking out of the water. A year or so since there was some talk of dynamiting the clearing away the spot, but no action in regard to it has yet been taken. The *Padilla* remained in the hands of the revolutionists until peace was declared. It was then turned over to the Colombian Government and renamed the *21 de Noviembre*.

## "RINGING THE BELLES."

Why should girls that wish to get married come to Panama?

Because it is the greatest place in the world for ringing the (belles) bells.


## The Siege of Aguadulce.

In January, 1902, Gen. Herrera, the Liberal leader, with his Indian allies under Victoriano Lorenzo appeared before the town of Aguadulce in the province of Coclé. The town was garrisoned by a government force of about 1,300 men under the command of Gen. Castro. The Liberal general demanded the unconditional surrender of the garrison, at the same time conveying the information of the loss of the *Lautaro* upon which the government troops had depended for supplies. The demand was refused, and on January 23d, the Liberals commenced the attack. After twenty-four hours' fighting the government forces were defeated, Gen. Castro and 350 of his men escaping to Panama. In this engagement some 750 men were killed and wounded on both sides, while the Liberal leaders reported the capture of 700 prisoners.

In June, 1902, the government despatched a force of 1,200 men to retake Aguadulce. The troops arrived at the town on June 20th and were immediately surrounded by a superior force of Liberals. The latter invested the place so closely as to cut off the besieged entirely from obtaining supplies. The government had provided the garrison with five hundred cattle, but these were mysteriously run off one night leaving the besieged practically without food. Such straits were they in that they were compelled to kill and eat their horses, and later on other animals, including the dogs. Decayed fruit, and pieces of palms and shrubs were also utilized to sustain life. The garrison continued to hold out until August 21, 1902, when it capitulated, over 1,000 prisoners and a large amount of ammunition falling into the enemy's hands. During the siege the garrison suffered the loss of some two hundred men through sickness and starvation.

Another revolutionary expedition organized in Nicaragua landed near Chame, Province of Panama, on September 1, 1902. The party consisted of about 120 men,

sixty of whom were experienced veterans, and had for their leader Gen. Domingo Diaz of Panama. At Chame the expedition was met by Papi Aizpuru, Secretary of Victoriano Lorenzo, with 300 Indians. The force marched to Bejuco where at a conference of the Liberal officers, Gen. Diaz was made the military and civil chief of the Liberal forces on the Isthmus.



**GENERAL ALBAN ENTERING COLON.**

(COURTESY OF DONALDO VELASCO.)

## **The Story of Victoriano Lorenzo.**

The Indians of the Province of Coclé have been more or less independent as far back as history has knowledge of. It has been their custom to select a governor from among their number to whom all tribal differences are referred, and in whose leadership implicit confidence is placed

The Panama Government has given them the right of suffrage, but they have never evinced much of a desire to take a hand in matters political, and are content to till their fields and to carry on their small trading operations. In the revolution of 1900-'02 however, they constituted quite a factor in the warring elements, but it is doubtful if they would have taken a part in it, but for the personality of their Governor and leader, Victoriano Lorenzo, who, moved by a spirit of revenge joined issues with the Liberal forces, was made a general and afterwards assisted greatly in the victories of that side. One of the commodities in which these Indians deal largely is salt, and in securing their support to the revolutionary movement, they were led to believe that if the Liberals were successful, they would be permitted a free trade in it.

About the time the revolution broke out, Victoriano Lorenzo had a large farm and was attending strictly to his own affairs. He had one annoyance and that was the constant nagging of a petty official. Lorenzo finally gave the latter to understand that if he was troubled any further he would take steps to stop it. The official paying no attention to this warning, Lorenzo abducted him and took him into the mountains. The government hearing of this summary action sent troops to Lorenzo's home where they committed various sorts of depredations. This coming to the knowledge of Lorenzo, and believing himself an outlaw, he proceeded to revenge himself in Indian style by performing savage atrocities on the prisoners he captured. On one occasion he killed a Spanish priest.

By this time he had enlisted quite a following and tiring of the outlawed existence which he led, he joined the Liberal forces and carried on a guerrilla warfare. On joining the revolutionists he ceased committing acts outside the pale of civilization, and conducted himself more in accordance with the usages of war. When hostilities ceased, a general amnesty was declared whereby the adherents of the Liberal cause without exception were allowed to

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either leave the country, or return to their homes unmolested. Lorenzo believing himself secure under this proclamation made no effort to hide, or flee the country. By the authorities however, he was regarded as an unsafe man, and later through the efforts of Gen. Benjamin Herrera he was apprehended and turned over to the Colombian officials.

He was held a prisoner for some months during which time on one occasion he made his escape only to be recaptured the same day. It is believed by some that the escape was "arranged" in order that an additional charge might be secured against him. In 1903, after the country had become tranquil again, a commission was despatched from Bogota with orders to execute Lorenzo. On May 14, 1903 he was condemned to be shot for committing robberies and assassinations, and performing acts contrary to civilized warfare. Moved probably by a spirit of

fair play, the Governor, foreign consuls and prominent citizens endeavored to secure a mitigation of the sentence, but the Bogota commission declared they were acting under specific orders to have him executed, and he was accordingly shot in the Plaza de Armas on May 15, 1903.

### **Sign Treaty of Peace on "Wisconsin".**

In April, 1902, the Archbishop of Bogota issued an encyclical under the authority of the Catholic Church of



**GEN. PERDOMO,  
THE COLOMBIAN PEACE ENVOY.**

(COURTESY OF DONALDO VELASCO.)

Colombia, in which it was stated that in order to show a christian spirit, avoid further bloodshed, and to end the bitter struggle that was ruining the country, the Liberals would

be granted immunity and forgiveness, provided they would lay down their arms and agree to peace. They were also promised equal rights, representation and personal freedom without prejudice to their opinions. This letter did not have immediate effect in bringing hostilities to a close, but later in the year after an exchange of numerous communications between the Liberal and Government leaders, a satisfactory understanding was arrived at, and on the 21st of November, 1902, a treaty of peace was signed on board of the United States battleship "Wisconsin", Capt. Casey Commander, in Panama harbor. In bringing these negotiations to a conclusion, Gen. B. Herrera represented the Liberals, while Gen. Victor M. Salazar, then Governor of Panama, Gen. Alfredo Vasquez Cobo, and Gen. Nicolas Perdomo, the latter being the special envoy from Bogota, represented the side of the Government.

### **Applied for Annexation.**

Under date of November 28th, 1899, before the revolution had broken out on the Isthmus, the *Star & Herald* printed the following Washington dispatch:—


"Panama has applied for annexation, but in view of the fact that Panama is not an independent republic, the authorities deem it advisable not to jeopardize the friendly relations of the Bogota Government with this country, and the application has been filed."

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### **POLYGLOT PANAMA.**

From the day of discovery until now the Isthmus has only been a landing place and portorage for those that came and went, and who wished most heartily it had been an open sea instead. Captains of ships all the way from the dinky old galleons to the floating palaces of the present day have found it an interposition of Divine Providence, in their opinion uncalled for. Panama hav-





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# STORY OF THE YOUNGEST REPUBLIC

**With Some Side Lights on the Historic Drama  
of 1903, in which the Interests of three  
Countries Were Involved.**

Although four years have elapsed since the Republic of Panama took its place in the ranks of the world's free and independent nations, the dramatic events that led up to and surrounded the secessionary movement have never been clearly understood. Links have been missing, and some perhaps are still missing, in the chain of circumstances, the forging of which began with the negotiations for a canal treaty between the United States and Colombia; reached the white-heat stage in the revolutionary incidents of 1903, culminating in the tempered and finished period of the

ing a cosmopolitan population peculiar to itself is not strictly speaking a sea-faring community. The linguistic accomplishments of its people has often been remarked. It is rare to find among the educated classes a person whose means of expression is confined to one tongue or language. It is not unusual to hear half a dozen languages used at once in any chance crowd. Gibraltar with its "rock scorpions" has a world-wide reputation for a Babel of tongues, while large cities like London, New York and Paris embrace widely different races, but we venture to say for its size there is no successful rival in this small world of ours equal to the polyglot city of Panama.—From the Panama "Star and Herald", January 26, 1877, at that time edited in three languages.

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present, as represented by the impending treaty with Colombia, in which amicable relations between Panama and the mother country bid fair to be restored. Mr. F. L. Rockwood who has furnished The Pilot and Guide with much information in connection with this article, was a resident of the Colombian Capital while these events were taking place, and speaks of the situation there from personal knowledge. The plot and the cast have been at hand. The dramatization only has been lacking.—Editor.

**Why the Colombian Treaty Failed.**

It is necessary to take a dispassionate view from both sides to understand the events that put in action the separation from Colombia, and made the Republic of Panama a reality. When the United States undertook to negotiate a canal treaty with Colombia in the earlier part of 1903, one of the important and leading figures of the latter country, of whom there is very little known outside, was Dr. José M. Marroquin, a man then about 67 years of age, of excellent character and reputation, and by profession a doctor of laws. The sudden retirement of President Sanclemente brought Marroquin into the presidency as a representative of the Conservative party, otherwise known as

the Clerical party from its deference to the Church in affairs of state and administration of laws. The government at the capital at the time of Marroquin's ascendancy was dominated by an unprincipled political faction whose policy was rule or ruin, and paved the way for the long and wasteful three years' war. With the return of peace and the assembling of Congress, the government found itself still dominated by this faction in both branches, which was worse than the open revolutions of the Liberal party.

It is but just to state that the Colombian Congress contained many patriotic and high-minded men who endeavored to act for their country's good, but the factional element was for getting the government into their hands at any cost and incidentally the control of the \$20,000,000 national annual income, compared to which the Isthmus and the canal cut but a secondary figure. They had as their leader Gen. Velez, who was slated for the presidency if a change could be effected.

At the time when the war of the revolution was in full swing on the Isthmus, President Marroquin appealed for help from the United States Government to preserve order there in favor of his government, especially along the line of railroad, promising in return that when the revolution was over, he would sign a canal treaty, thereby pledging the word of his country as its president. The United States landed troops and thereafter until the cessation of hostilities kept the transit clear.

Then came the assembling of the Colombian Congress for the discussion of the proposed canal treaty, and President Marroquin was informed that he would not be allowed to comply with his word unless authorized by it, despite the special powers that had previously been conferred upon him for this purpose, in which the honor of his country was compromised.

The Colombian Congress was duly put on notice concerning action on the treaty as evidenced by the following

memorandum presented by the United States Minister at Bogota to the Colombian Government, June 13th, 1903:—

Sir:—I have received instructions from my government by cable to the effect that the Government of Colombia, by all appearances, does not fully appreciate the gravity of the situation. The negotiations for the sale of the canal at Panama were initiated by Colombia, and were urgently solicited from my government for many years. The propositions presented by Colombia, with a few modifications, were finally adopted by the United States. In virtue of this agreement our Congress revoked its previous decision, and decided for the Panama route. If Colombia now rejects the treaty, or unduly delays its ratification, the amicable relations existing between the two countries will be so seriously compromised that our Congress in its next session may adopt measures that may be regretted by all friends of Colombia.

This evidently had no impression on the dominant faction in the Colombian Congress, as indicated in the following cables to the *Panama Star & Herald*:

Bogota, July 7, 1903.

Gen. Velez, leader of the opposition said, "My countrymen are opposed to the treaty as it now stands, as they do not think that the United States has been generous enough in the terms offered."

Bogota, July 8, 1903.

About President Marroquin signing the canal treaty, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in a much applauded speech answered all of Caro's arguments, finally convincing the Senate that they must approve the canal treaty before the President's signature.

It was apparent to President Marroquin that the factional element was using the canal question to place him out of power and bring their following into control of the government, and that to attain this object they were ready and perfectly willing to sacrifice the canal treaty.

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OPERA HOUSE DEPARTMENT OF THE Isthmian Canal Commission

After two months or more of debate in both houses the treaty came to a vote in the lower branch of Congress and was endorsed by that body. It then went to the Senate where Velez and his following had made all preparations to fight it to the last ditch. The result appears in the cable herewith:—

Bogota, August 12, 1903.

The Hay-Herran canal treaty was defeated in the Colombian Senate to-day.

Immediately the result became known, President Marroquin adopted a course which had for its object the placing of the dominant political faction in the Colombian Senate in a corner at any cost. He made up his mind that as president of the country his word would be complied with indirectly, if it could not be directly, and accordingly appointed Don Domingo de Obaldia, who was pronounced and outspoken in the interests




went on to state that according to advices he had received, there was a revolutionary junta working in New York and Washington, and it was apparent there would be trouble at Panama. The President replied to this in a saying that "Sometimes the unexpected happens."

It was the general belief of those who knew President Marroquin intimately as well as the circumstances surrounding the Panama affair, that he allowed the secessionary movement to proceed without taking any decisive steps to stave it off, not altogether to revenge himself for the slight put upon him by the Velez faction, but as a lesson for the betterment of his country, and to avoid a repetition of the occurrences that characterized the revolution of 1899 to 1902. The manner in which events shaped themselves is now accepted in Colombia as one of the best things that could have happened for the reason that the affairs of Panama have always proved a fruitful source of dissension in Colombian politics, while its secession has operated to remove this discordant factor, thereby turning the thoughts of its people into wiser and broader-minded channels. Ex-President Marroquin to-day has the respect of all in the Colombian capital, whereas if it was thought that he had perpetrated a grievous wrong on his country, his presence would not have been tolerated for a moment.

The defeating of the canal treaty does not appear to have met the will or the wishes of the people of Colombia as a whole, but was brought about through the scheming of a political clique that had been drawn together by the possibility of getting the reins of government into its hands. The excuse used by Velez and his champions in blocking favorable action on the treaty in the Colombian Senate was that the United States did not offer enough for the privileges sought for and that it would be prejudicial to the integrity of the Republic to permit the American Government to exercise supreme control over the canal strip, this despite the fact that the lower house ratified the trea-



ty without question. Moreover, the amount of \$10,000,000 that would have changed hands upon the successful issue of the treaty was far more liberal than any proposition



SCENE IN COLON IN 1855.

(COURTESY OF G. ANDREVE.)

theretofore made the Colombian Government in connection with the canal undertaking. Then too, Velez was an avowed enemy of progress and his antipathy to foreigners and foreign enterprises was notorious.

After Congress adjourned, the action of the Colombian Senate in turning down the canal treaty crystallized public sentiment against Velez, and it is extremely probable that could the matter have come up again a few months later, the result would have been decidedly different. President Roosevelt's reference to the defeat of the treaty in his message to Congress states:—

“During all the years of negotiation and discussion that preceded the conclusion of the Hay-Herran treaty, Colombia never intimated that the requirement by the United States of control over the canal strip would render unattainable the construction of a canal by way of the Isthmus of Panama; nor were we advised, during the months when legislation of 1902 was pending before the Congress, that the terms which it embodied would render negotiations with Colombia impracticable. It is plain that no nation could construct and guarantee the neutrality of the canal with a less degree of control than was stipulated in the Hay-Herran treaty. A refusal to grant such degree of control was necessarily a refusal to make any practicable treaty at all. Such refusal therefore squarely raised the question whether Colombia was entitled to bar the transit of the world's traffic across the Isthmus. . . . Colombia, after having rejected the treaty in spite of our protest and warnings when it was in her power to accept it, has since shown the utmost eagerness to accept the same treaty if only the *status quo* could be restored. One of the men standing highest in the official circles of Colombia on November 6, 1903, addressed the American Minister at Bogota, saying that if the Government of the United States would land troops to preserve Colombian sovereignty and the transit, the Colombian Government would declare martial law, and by virtue of vested constitutional authority, when public order is disturbed (would) approve by decree the ratification of the canal treaty as signed; or, if the Government of the United States prefers (would)

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call an extra session of the Congress—with new and friendly members—next May to approve the treaty. Having these facts in view, there is no shadow of a question that the Government of the United States proposed a treaty that was not only just, but generous to Colombia, which our people regarded as erring, if at all; on the side of overgenerosity; which was hailed with delight by the people of the immediate locality through which the canal was to pass, who were most concerned as to the new order of things, and which the Colombian authorities now recognize as being so good that they are willing to promise its unconditional ratification if only we will desert those who have shown themselves our friends and restore to those who have shown themselves unfriendly, the power to undo what they did. I pass by the question as to what assurance we have that they would now keep their pledge and not again refuse to ratify the treaty if they had the power; for of course, I will not for one moment discuss the possibility of the United States committing an act of such baseness as to abandon the new Republic of Panama.”

In 1904, Gen. Velez the leader of the anti-canal faction was a candidate for the Colombian presidency against Gen. Reyes, but he was overwhelmingly defeated and died shortly afterwards. When Gen. Reyes assumed the chair he found the same anti-canal faction working against him and he proceeded to eradicate it by radical measures. Over four hundred, including men of wealth and ability, were arrested and deported to the military penal colony of Macoa on one of the branches of the Amazon, two months' journey from Bogota, from where prisoners seldom return. President Reyes in explaining his action stated that the riddance of this faction was made necessary for the maintenance of peace and prosperity. Others fled the country and are now living abroad. The measure appears to have been successful for Colombia has been enjoying an era of peace unusual in its history.

### **The Secession Pot Begins To Boil.**

That the Hay-Herran treaty would never be ratified by the Colombian Congress appears to have been regarded by the people of the Isthmus as a foregone conclusion. In his clever little book in Spanish on the "Independence of the Isthmus," Don José Augustin Arango, who was a member of the original junta of separation and who had been prominently identified with the movement since its inception, states, "I was a senator in the Colombian National Congress of 1903, but I refused to attend as I was completely convinced that the treaty would not go through, and could see no other way than a separation from Colombia to save the Isthmus from ruin." The Colombian Senate was to have adjourned on Sept. 22, 1903, but a month before that date the opinion was generally shared in that no favorable action would be taken.

In the forepart of August, 1903, a number of prominent citizens of Panama came together and earnestly discussed the chances for success in a movement looking to

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the severance of political ties with Colombia. The result was the naming of a junta consisting of Messrs. José Augustin Arango, Federico Boyd, Ricardo Arias, Nicanor A. de Obarrio, Manuel Espinosa B., and Dr. Manuel Amador Guerrero, the latter now President of the Republic. Plans were laid, and to Dr. Amador was entrusted the delicate mission to visit the United States to ascertain by means of interviews how the movement would be looked upon there. In this connection Dr. Amador was to have the able assistance of Capt. Beers, formerly freight agent for the Panama Railroad.

During the last days of August a meeting was held in New York City attended by Dr. Amador, Amadeo Arosemena, Tracy Robinson, formerly with the Panama Railroad Company at Colon, J. Gabriel Duque of the Panama "Star & Herald", and G. Lewis, also of Panama. The New York World said of this meeting and its results:—

"They went over the whole situation in detail and figured out the strength of the armed force they could raise as compared with the Colombian army on the Isthmus, and decided that the revolt should take place September 22, on the day the Colombian Congress was to adjourn. It was arranged that Panama and Colon should be seized simultaneously, and the new Republic proclaimed throughout the Isthmus. Resistance was only expected at Colon and Panama, and as the garrisons at both places were small, it was thought they could be easily overthrown. It was reported to the committee that the United States would view the revolt with favor, and would take an

indirect hand in it by at once landing marines to keep the Isthmus open for traffic, and would permit no fighting along the line, or at either end of it. The revolutionists appreciated that this attitude would be of immense advantage to whoever was in control at Panama and Colon, and it was decided to center all their energies at these points."

"J. Gabriel Duque was selected to visit Washington and acquaint the administration confidentially with the plans. He went there at once and on September 3 had a long talk with Secretary Hay in which he unfolded the whole Panama scheme. Mr. Hay had heard of it before and was interested chiefly in the date set for the revolution, and the exact nature of the plans. Mr. Hay did not officially countenance the revolution. His remarks were perfectly proper; it was what he did not say, rather than what he did say that encouraged the revolutionists and caused them to change their plans."

"You are much too hasty", said Mr. Hay when he was told of the date set for the revolt. "Colombia should be given a chance to repent. If she should show no signs of repentance within a reasonable time, you would of course, be free to take any action you saw fit, as you are now, but it seems to me it would look much better to wait six weeks or so. Of course you understand that if there is a revolution the United States will keep the Isthmus open and allow no fighting near the railway. If there is to be any fighting it will have to be done before our marines get there."

Mr. Duque returned to New York, told of the result of his visit, whereupon it was decided that the new government should not be set up, or proclaimed until the 4th of November.

### **Colombia Gets The News.**

Within a few days after the conference with Mr. Hay, Dr. Herran the Colombian Minister cabled his government full information concerning the revolutionary movement, setting forth that it was serious, and that the gar-

risons at Panama and Colon should be strengthened at once. He was informed that his advice had been followed, and that there were 2,000 picked men at Panama, whereas the garrison numbered only about 400. When it was too late Colombia acted upon Dr. Herran's suggestion, for it was not until November 3, the day the new republic was proclaimed, that a Colombian gunboat and a chartered steamer arrived at Colon from Cartagena with 300 troops on board of one, and 200 on the other.

The letting of the cat out of the bag created some commotion in the revolutionary camp, and led them to be extremely cautious in their future movements. Dr. Herran wrote the representative of the French canal company to the effect that he would hold them responsible for what



*PLAZA BOLIVAR. (DAVID, R. OF P.)*

*(COURTESY OF G. ANDREVE.)*

transpired in this case. After this occurrence the cable only was used for the transmission of instructions.

### **No Coal for Colombian Boats.**

"We thought it best," writes Don Arango in his Notes "to let Col. J. R. Shaler, Superintendent of the Panama Railroad Company, know of our plan through Capt. Beers, so one day when both were in my office Capt. Beers explained what we intended doing. Among the things that came up was the supplying the Commanding General of the Colombian military forces with 200 tons of coal, which the General asked through the Governor at first, then directly of the railroad company. It was explained that this coal was urgently needed for the Colombian gunboats Padilla and Bogota, which were under hurry orders to go to Buenaventura, and bring the troops that were there ready to embark for Panama. As this would have been fatal to our plans, Col. Shaler consulted with me as to the best way of evading delivery of the coal. The only way we could see was to put off the request from day to day by telling the General that the coal was in Colon, although there was a great quantity in Panama, and some of it had already been sold to the different steamship companies."

"Supt. Shaler gave me authority to look after this matter, and I was able to put off the Commanding General in spite of the notes which he sent me to supply the two vessels named. I had talked with Gen. Varon, commanding the Padilla, and ascertained that he was in sympathy with our cause, and afterwards Dr. Amador had a clearer understanding with him. We then advised that the Padilla could receive coal, and after a talk with Col. Shaler over the telephone about it, the supply was furnished. We also offered to supply the Bogota, but mentally had no intention of following up the offer. I advised Col. Shaler to take the matter in hand directly in case the Commanding General was not satisfied with my promises,